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INTRODUCTION
From 1987 until 2001, containers bearing the seemingly legiti-
mate label "seafood" crossed the oceans on ships bound from South
Africa for the United States, Hong Kong, and other worldwide desti-
nations.' The containers' locked doors, however, concealed millions
upon millions of dollars worth of illegally harvested rock lobster and
t B.A., Cornell University, 2002;J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2008; Managing
Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 93. 1 would like to thank Marcus Asner, Victor Rocco,
and Eric Creizman for inspiring this topic. Many thanks to Professor Stephen P. Garvey for
his helpful comments. I am grateful to Etienne Townsend, Ben Carlisle, Brendan Mahan,
and the members of the Cornell Law Review for their excellent editing. Thanks to my family
and friends for their love and support.
I Indictment at 21-25, United States v. Bengis, S1 03 Cr. 308 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
[hereinafter Bengis Indictment].
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Patagonian toothfish-more commonly known as Chilean sea bass2-
destined for sale to restaurants in New York and elsewhere. 3 At the
helm of this smuggling scheme was Arnold Bengis, a wealthy U.S. citi-
zen 4 and the owner of one of the largest fishing operations in Cape
Town, South Africa. 5 For nearly fourteen years, Bengis and others
plundered the seas for illicit aquatic booty. In the process, they devas-
tated these lucrative marine resources, perhaps irrevocably. 6
While few may know it, Chilean sea bass are heavily overfished. 7
In recent years, an effort to prevent overfishing led twenty-three coun-
tries to join the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources, an international effort calling for rational harvest-
ing of fish living in the international waters around Antarctica. 8 In
addition to the Convention, several countries have instituted strict
regulatory regimes that impose catch limits on fishing vessels operat-
ing from their ports.9 For example, South Africa codified its regula-
tions in the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998 (Marine Act).10 The
Marine Act proscribes, among other things, the harvesting or process-
ing of fish without a permit. 1
In the United States, the Lacey Act 12 is one of the primary federal
conservation statutes. The Act makes it unlawful for any person "to
import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in inter-
state or foreign commerce . . .any fish or wildlife taken, possessed,
transported, or sold in violation of any.., foreign law.' 1 3 In 1981, the
Senate explained that the Lacey Act addressed a formidable target:
In recent years, investigations by agents of the various agencies
charged with enforcing wildlife laws have uncovered a massive ille-
2 Chilean sea bass "is neither from Chile nor a sea bass." Vancouver Aquarium, U.S.:
New Report Gives More Reasons to Pass on Sea Bass, Sept. 22, 2004, http://www.vanaqua.org/
aquanew/fullnews.php?id=1633. The fish found popularity in the United States in the
mid-1990s. See id.
3 See Bengis Indictment, supra note 1, at 22, 43.
4 See Transcript of Plea at 14, Bengw, S1 03 Cr. 308 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2004)
[hereinafter Transcript of Plea].
5 See Bengis Indictment, supra note 1, at 1-3.
6 See id. at 1-3, 12-14.
7 See U.S. Dept. of State, Chilean Sea Bass Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/fs/2002/8989.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
8 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources art. 2, May
5, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 841, available at http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e-pubs/bd/ptl.pdf.
9 See, e.g., PHILIPPE CACAUD, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, FISHERIES LAWS AND REGULATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
9-13 (2005), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/y5880e/y5880eOO.pdf.
10 Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998, available at http://www.info.gov.za/ga-
zette/acts/1998/alS-98.pdf.
11 Combined, sections 13(1) and 58(1) (a) (i) of the Marine Act make it an offense to
harvest, process, or possess fish without a permit. See id. §§ 13(1), 58(1) (a) (i).
12 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-78 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
13 Id. § 3372(a) (2) (A).
[Vol. 93:849
RESTITUTION AND THE LA CEY ACT
gal trade in fish and wildlife and their parts and products. Evidence
indicates that much of this illegal, and highly profitable, trade is
handled by well organized large volume operations run by profes-
sional criminals. The more sophisticated operations utilize "white
collar" crime tactics such as multiple invoicing and other fraudulent
documentation to carry out and conceal their illicit activities.14
In 2004, defendant Arnold Bengis pled guilty in United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York to orchestrating a
conspiracy to smuggle approximately $90 million in illegally harvested
sea bass and other marine life into the United States and elsewhere. 15
When the shipments arrived in U.S. ports, Bengis and his co-defend-
ants supplied false documentation to U.S. Customs officials. 16 The
conspirators unloaded the containers and transported the seafood to
Bengis's affiliate companies in Maine and New York. 17 Bengis also
smuggled undocumented workers from Cape Town to work for low
wages in his Maine processing plant.1 8 Bengis and his company, Hout
Bay, exploited local South Africans in harvesting South Coast and
West Coast rock lobster'-9-two of the world's most sought-after spe-
cies of lobster.20 These lobsters inhabit deep ocean waters, typically
twenty-four to sixty miles from the South African coast. 21 To maxi-
mize its catch allowed under South African law, Hout Bay bought local
lobster fishermen's quotas established by the Marine Act and hired
those fishermen to work as crewmen on Hout Bay's vessels. 22 These
14 S. REP. No. 97-123, at 1 (1981).
15 See Transcript of Plea, supra note 4, at 14; Government's Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to Defendants' Joint Motion to Preclude and/or Limit Restitution at 1-2,
United States v. Bengis, Si 03 Cr. 308 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Opposi-
tion to Motion to Preclude].
16 See Bengis Indictment, supra note 1, at 16-17.
17 See id. at 2-3, 17.
18 See id. at 17-18; Government's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants'
Joint Motion for a Departure from the Applicable Sentencing Guidelines Range at 3,
Bengis, S1 03 Cr. 308 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2004) [hereinafter Opposition to Sentenc-
ing Guidelines].
19 See Government's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Joint Motion
for a Departure from the Applicable Sentencing Guidelines Range, Exhibit C, Declaration
of Advocate Bruce Morrison at 2-3, Bengis, S1 03 Cr. 308 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2004)
[hereinafter Declaration of Bruce Morrison]; Bengis Indictment, supra note 1, at 1-2.
20 The South African lobster industry supplies less than two percent of the worldwide
demand for lobster. ENVIRo-FIsH-ARIcA, AN ECONOMIC AND SECTORAL STUDY OF THE
SOUTH AFRICAN FISHING INDUSTRY, VOLUME 3, WEST COAST ROCK LOBSTER 187, available at
http://www.envirofishafrica.co.za/ess/ESS2000WEBSITE/chapters/wc-rock-lobster.pdf.
The industry exports frozen lobster tails, whole frozen lobster, whole cooked lobster, and
live lobster to the United States and other countries, generating profits of approximately
200 million Rand. Id. That profit figure converts into approximately $24.4 million, based
on the March 23, 2008 exchange rate of 1 Rand per 0.1222 U.S. Dollar. SeeYahoo! Finance
Currency Converter, http://finance.yahoo.com/currency (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
21 See Bengis Indictment, supra note 1, at 2-3.
22 See id. at 8, 12-13. South Africa's MCM quota regime permitted this practice of
assigning quotas. See id. at 8.
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crewmen processed the South Coast lobster while at sea and discarded
everything but the tail, which they kept frozen. 23 Upon return to
Cape Town, workers at Hout Bay packaged the lobster tails and ex-
ported them to the United States. 24 After Hout Bay deducted ex-
penses for catching, processing, and marketing the lobsters, the
company agreed to remit profits to the various fishermen in relation
to their respective quotas.25
In practice, however, the fishermen never saw any of their prof-
its-the defendants simply stole them.26 In March 2002, Hout Bay
contracted for one such quota arrangement with Fullimput, a fishing
company based in Cape Town.27 After a lengthy voyage, Hout Bay
refused to pay the Fullimput fishermen their quota profits, amounting
to approximately 2,674,780 Rand,28 or approximately $327,000.29
The Government of South Africa instituted civil forfeiture pro-
ceedings against Hout Bay in 2001 for violations of the Marine Act
and the South African Customs and Excise Act.3 0 As a result, Bengis
paid approximately $6 million in fines to South Africa, not including
the value of his vessels seized by the government.31 In 2003, a U.S.
federal grand jury indicted Bengis for conspiracy to violate the Lacey
Act.3 2 The federal government prosecuted Bengis and his co-conspir-
ators under the federal conspiracy statute, which makes it unlawful for
"two or more persons [to] conspire ... to commit any offense against
the United States."33
Although Bengis and his co-conspirators pled guilty in 2004 and
have already served their sentences, restitution remains an ongoing
issue in their case. The United States has asked the District Court for
the Southern District of New York to award restitution to South Africa
in the amount of at least $39,726,070-a conservative effort to calcu-
late the actual harm of the defendants' activities on natural marine
23 See id. at 12-13.
24 See id.
25 See Government's Recommendation Concerning Restitution, Exhibit K, Affidavit of
Cameron John Ironside at paras. 6-15, United States v. Bengis, S1 03 Cr. 308 (LAK)
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2004).
26 See id. at para. 16.
27 See id. at paras. 6-15.
28 See id. at para. 24.
29 This conversion is based on the March 23, 2008 exchange rate of I Rand per
0.1222 U.S. Dollar. See Yahoo! Finance Currency Converter, http://finance.yahoo.com/
currency (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
30 See Declaration of Bruce Morrison, supra note 19, at 2-3, 5.
31 See id. at. 6; see also Transcript of Sentencing at 10, Bengis, S1 03 Cr. 308 (LAK)
(S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2004).
32 See Bengis Indictment, supra note 1, at 1-25.
33 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000).
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resources. 34 The United States downgraded this figure from prior es-
timates of approximately $90 million.3 5 In 2007, the district court,
after adopting a magistrate's recommendations, denied the govern-
ment's restitution request. 36 The government has filed a formal no-
tice of appeal with the Solicitor General of the United States.
Whether a foreign state can fall within the ambit of the federal statu-
tory regime for restitution 37 -and whether a U.S. court is competent
to decide that it does-remains an open question.
Successful conservation, however, requires international coopera-
tion. In some countries, helping to prevent the loss of an endangered
species may provide enough incentive to act.38 But in the world's
poorest nations, governments are willing to look the other way when
natural resources are decimated.39 There, a more creative solution is
necessary.
As I will argue, the United States can use the federal restitution
statutes as a "carrot" to encourage foreign states to assist in conserva-
tion efforts. If foreign governments believe that they may receive res-
titution as a victim, they will have an incentive to cooperate with
federal agencies and increase the chances of successful convictions
under the Lacey Act. The restitution statutes, however, are silent on
whether a foreign state can qualify as a victim. In Part I of this Note, I
discuss how courts use the purposive theory of statutory interpretation
to navigate around congressional silence. In Part II, I return to the
federal restitution statutes. First I examine Congress's stated purpose
in passing the Victim Witness Protection Act of 1982.40 Then I turn to
the evolving meaning of the term "victim." Next I discuss Congress's
renewed interest in restitution under the 1996 Mandatory Victim Res-
titution Act 41 and analyze the judicial interpretation of "victim" under
34 See Government's Recommendation Concerning Restitution at 1, Bengis, S1 03 Cr.
308 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2004).
35 See Opposition to Motion to Preclude, supra note 15, at 1-2, 29-30.
36 See Bengis, No. 03 Cr. 0308 (LAK), 2007 WL 2669315, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2007)
(denying government's restitution request under the Victim Witness Protection Act);
Bengis, No. 03 Cr. 0308 (LAK), 2007 WL 241370, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2007) (denying
government's restitution request under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act).
37 See infra Part III.
38 See, e.g., William H. Kaempfer & Anton D, Lowenberg, The Ivory Bandwagon: Interna-
tional Transmission of Interest-Group Politics, 4 INDEP. REV. 217, 219 (1999), available at http://
www.independent.org/pdf.tir/tir_04-2_kaempfer.pdf (discussing early-twentieth-century
efforts by European colonial powers to create a system of national parks in their African
colonies in order to preserve wildlife).
39 See id. at 220 (observing that in Kenya, Zambia, and other East African countries,
wages as low as $20 to $30 per month combined with minimal law enforcement resources
lead to rampant corruption among game wardens in national parks).
40 Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
41 Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1227,
1227-41 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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that act, concluding that courts have read this term expansively. In
Part III, I discuss the antitrust, RICO, and wire fraud statutes to illus-
trate how federal law allows foreign states to qualify as victims in other
contexts. Lastly, in Part IV, I argue that allowing foreign states to
claim restitution will best promote cooperation with U.S. agencies and
further the goals of international conservation.
As I discuss below, neither the restitution statutes themselves nor
their legislative history offer any guidance on whether the meaning of
"victim" includes foreign nations.42 At its core, the problem is one of
how to deal with congressional silence.
I
APPROACHES TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION-DEALING
WITH CONGRESSIONAL SILENCE
At first glance, it may seem that federal courts can award restitu-
tion only according to the strict textual limits of the restitution stat-
utes. Although some judges, most notably Justice Antonin Scalia,
champion such a strict textualist approach to statutory interpreta-
tion,43 the Supreme Court often draws on common-law norms to fill
in statutory ambiguity.44
Federal courts use well-established principles to navigate around
congressional silence. As the Supreme Court has made clear, courts
have an initial duty to interpret a statute "so as to effect its purpose."45
But if doubts exist over the purpose or meaning of a statutory term,
courts must then look to the common law:
Congress is understood to legislate against a background of com-
mon-law adjudicatory principles .... Thus, where a common-law
principle is well established ... the courts may take it as given that
Congress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will
apply except "when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident."46
It follows, therefore, that unless Congress restricts the common-
law remedy of restitution-a remedy that has historically fallen within
the equitable powers of courts47-federal judges need not view the
42 See infra Part II.
43 See ANTONIN SCALtA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw
23 (1997) ("We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute
means." (quotingJustice Holmes)).
44 See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605-06 (1994) (relying on the com-
mon-law presumption of mens rea in criminal statutes to hold that the statute in question
required mens rea).
45 Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952).
46 Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (internal
citations omitted) (quoting Isbrandtsen Co., 343 U.S. at 783).
47 See Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. REv. 1577,
1598-1606 (2002) (discussing the historical roots of restitution in courts of law and eq-
uity). Judges have always had broad discretion in deciding whether or not to award restitu-
[Vol. 93:849
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restitution statutes48 as limiting their judicial discretion. Rather,
judges can utilize the modern theory of "purposive interpretation" to
conclude that Congress intended to allow foreign states to seek resti-
tution in federal courts.
During the Progressive era, legal commentators began to cham-
pion legislative competence and marginalize judicial discretion. 49
Chief among these commentators was botanist-turned-Harvard Law
School Dean Roscoe Pound, who wrote in 1908:
It is fashionable to preach the superiority ofjudge-made law. It may
be well, however, for judges and lawyers to remember that there is
tion. For example, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, German courts adopted the
"adhesive procedure" (Adhdsionsprozess), which gave judges discretion to grant victims'
claims for restitution in criminal cases. See BruceJacob, The Concept of Restitution: An Histor-
ical Overview, in RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF SANCTIONS 45,
48 (Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway, eds., 1975); STEPHEN SCHAFER, COMPENSATION AND RESTI-
TUTION TO VICTIMS OF CRIME 9 (2d ed. 1970). English courts of the same era demonstrated
a similar preference for awarding restitution. See Brian Kleinhaus, Serving Two Masters:
Evaluating the Criminal or Civil Nature of the VWPA and MVRA Through the Lens of the Ex Post
Facto Clause, the Abatement Doctrine, and the Sixth Amendment, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2711, 2718
n.44 (2005) (citing Blackstone for the proposition that English common law authorized
judges to issue writs of restitution to robbery victims).
In 1982, the Senate Judiciary Committee made clear, in sweeping language, that the
restitution principle "is an integral part of virtually every formal system of criminal justice,
of every culture and every time." S. REP. No. 97-532, at 30 (1982), as reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2536. The principle commands that "whatever else the sanctioning
power of society does to punish its wrongdoers, it should also insure that the wrongdoer is
required to the degree possible to restore the victim to his or her prior state of well-being."
Id.
As history shows, restitution has deep roots in Western civilization. The Code of Ham-
murabi and the Bible both refer to restitution as a preferred remedy over physical punish-
ment, and they treat restitution as a punishment in itself. See Kleinhaus, supra, at 2717.
Hammurabi's code, for example, required certain criminals to compensate their victims
thirty times greater than the damage they caused. SeeJacob, supra, at 46. By the Middle
Ages, some Western societies merged the concepts of restitution and punishment. See
SCHAFER, supra, at 5. For example, under Germanic common law, "[t]he 'law of injury'
seem[ed] to have been ruled by the idea of reciprocity." Id. During this period, a new
preference for monetary damages emerged as the remedy for private wrongs. See id. at
5-6. By the twelfth century, however, the use of restitution had dwindled as Western mon-
archies began to see crimes as offenses against the King. SeeJacob, supra, at 47 ("[T]he
State's right to punish and exact compensation from the victim superseded the victim's
right to recover compensation."). Once states established a monopoly on punishing
criminals under developing bodies of criminal law, victims had to look to civil law for resti-
tution. See id. (stating that notions of "victim's rights" and restitution "were separated from
the criminal law and instead became incorporated into the civil law of torts"). Thus began
the development of jurisprudence protecting the rights of the criminal defendant rather
than the rights of the victim. See David L. Roland, Progress in the Victim Reform Movement: No
Longer the "Forgotten Victim," 17 PEPP. L. REv. 35, 35 (1989) ("The [criminal justice] system,
as it evolved, protected the rights of the accused with zeal, while ignoring the victim's
plight."). As Stephen Schafer notes, "The victim became the Cinderella of the criminal
law." SCHAFER, supra, at 8. In light of these historical and equitable roots, Congress set out
to craft restitution guidelines for federal courts in 1982. See infra Part II.
48 See infra Part II.
49 See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REv. 383 (1908).
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coming to be a science of legislation and that modern statutes are
not to be disposed of lightly as off-hand products of a crude desire
to do something, but represent long and patient study by experts,
careful consideration by conferences or congresses or associations,
press discussions in which public opinion is focused upon all impor-
tant details, and hearings before legislative committees.
50
At this time, courts began to take a slightly more deferential approach
that still allowed for judicial discretion.51 Rather than resisting statu-
tory language in favor of common-law principles, judges embraced
statutory text.52 If necessary, judges departed from that text to give
effect to the "purpose" of the legislation. 5 3 The Supreme Court ex-
plained that when the plain meaning of a statute
has led to absurd or futile results... this Court has looked beyond
the words to the purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even
when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely
an unreasonable one "plainly at variance with the policy of the legis-
lation as a whole" this Court has followed that purpose, rather than
the literal words.5 4
A key supporter of purposive interpretation was Judge Learned
Hand. Hand believed that judges needed discretion to legislate be-
yond statutory text when "slavish" adherence to the text thwarted con-
gressional purpose.5 5 Commenting that there is "no surer way to
misread any document than to read it literally," 56 Hand characterized
his interpretive process as "'an act of creative imagination' and an
'undertaking of delightful uncertainty.' "57 In an opinion interpreting
tax law, Hand clarified why creativity is essential to purposive
interpretation:
[A]s the articulation of a statute increases, the room for interpreta-
tion must contract; but the meaning of a sentence may be more
50 Id. at 383-84.
51 See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATU-
TORY INTERPRETATION 115 (1999) (describing purposive interpretation, where "[t] he domi-
nant practice was to extend statutes to achieve their purpose . . . rather than to limit
statutes to preserve the common law").
52 See id. Legislative history suddenly "became a competent and reliable source of
information about what the legislature was doing." Id. at 121. This new approach was
significant because "prior judicial practice had excluded evidence of statutory meaning
from written legislative materials." Id. at 122. In United States v. American Trucking Associa-
tions, "[t]he court affirmed the importance of the text as evidence of purpose." Id. at 132
(citing 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940)).
53 See id. at 132.
54 United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (quoting Oawa v.
United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922)).
55 SeeJohn M. Walker, Jr., Judicial Tendencies in Statutoy Construction: Differing Views on
the Role of the Judge, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 203, 215 (2001).
56 Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, J., concurring).
57 Walker, supra note 55, at 216-17.
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than that of the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes,
and no degree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to the set-
ting in which all appear, and which all collectively create. 58
I am not suggesting that courts must exercise unbridled discre-
tion to find that foreign states can qualify as victims under the federal
restitution statutes. As discussed below, the statutes are silent on
whether such entities qualify as victims. 59 But through a purposive
reading of the restitution statutes, judges can properly conclude that
foreign states may qualify as victims. Here, Learned Hand's words are
particularly relevant, as a literal reading of the restitution statutes
would surely thwart Congress's goal of championing restitution as a
broad-based, fundamental remedy. 60 Thus, courts can remain true to
their equitable role6 while giving effect to congressional intent.
II
WHO QUALIFIES AS A VICTIM UNDER THE
RESTITUTION STATUTES
A. The Evolving Meaning of "Victim" in the Victim Witness
Protection Act of 1982
Lamenting that federal courts had marginalized restitution to "an
occasional afterthought"62 by the early 1980s, Congress sought to re-
quire new "constructive, victim-oriented sentencing practices" to ad-
dress crime victims' financial losses. 63 This effort resulted in the
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA) .64
In the opening provisions of the VWPA, Congress enumerated its
purposes:
58 Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934).
59 See infra Part II.
60 See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
61 Federal courts remain free to award restitution through their equity jurisdiction
independent of any statutory command. Under the Rehnquist Court's canons of statutory
construction, separation of powers principles dictate that thejudiciary can dispense equita-
ble remedies. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 323-25
(1994). Federal courts' equitable jurisdiction has "a background of several hundred years
of history," Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944), and "the comprehensiveness of
this equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid
legislative command," Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946). At its es-
sence, equity jurisdiction gives judges the power to fashion flexible remedies on a case-by-
case basis. See Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 329. In passing the mandatory and discretionary resti-
tution statutes, see infra Part II, Congress, by "endow[ing] the federal courts with equitable
jurisdiction .... acts aware of this longstanding tradition of flexibility." California v. Am.
Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 295 (1990). As Congress has not provided a clear statement
indicating that foreign states are never entitled to claim victim status, federal judges should
be free to draw on their equitable powers and award restitution to victimized foreign states.
62 S. REP. No. 97-532, at 30 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2536.
63 Id. at 31, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2537.
64 Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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(1) to enhance and protect the necessary role of crime victims
and witnesses in the criminal justice process;
(2) to ensure that the Federal Government does all that is pos-
sible within limits of available resources to assist victims and wit-
nesses of crime without infringing on the constitutional rights of
the defendant; and
(3) to provide a model for legislation for State and local
governments.
65
Initially, Congress provided little guidance to clarify just who-or
what-could constitute a victim. In fact, it included no definition or
qualifiers whatsoever. 66 The restitution provision of the VWPA simply
reads, "The court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an of-
fense under this title . . . may order . . .that the defendant make
restitution to any victim of the offense." 6 7
The legislative history, however, suggests that to a limited extent,
Congress acknowledged that "victim" could include nonpersons. The
Senate Judiciary Committee explained that federal presentence re-
ports must include a victim impact statement "even in cases where the
crime is legally perpetrated against an institution, such as a bank, and
there is a human victim such as a bank teller."68 In addition, the Com-
mittee noted that organizations, insurance companies, and state vic-
tim compensation programs might qualify as third parties eligible to
receive restitution under the VWPA.69
The VWPA made clear that restitution is only available to victims
of those crimes listed under 18 U.S.C. or under section 902 of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958,70 implying that Congress did not con-
sider restitution appropriate for every conceivable violation of U.S. law.
Indeed, the Committee indicated that restitution would not be availa-
ble in those cases dealing with antitrust, securities, and regulatory vio-
lations, all of which trigger "complex issues which are outside the
intended scope of Section 3579 such as .. .causation." 7 1 If Congress
feared that restitution proceedings would falter because of difficult
causation problems accompanying large-scale, economically-oriented
65 Id. § 2(b), 96 Stat. at 1248-49 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1512 note
(2000)).
66 Compare id. § 5, 96 Stat. at 1253-55 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663)
(describing an order of restitution and a procedure for issuance of that order for victims,
but not defining the term "victim"), with id. § 4, 96 Stat. at 1252 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1512) (providing definitions for several terms, including "official proceeding" and
.misleading conduct" in different sections amended by the VWPA).
67 Id. § 5, 96 Stat. at 1253 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663).
68 S. REP. No. 97-532, at 13, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2519.
69 See id. at 32-33, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2538-39.
70 See § 5, 96 Stat. at 1253 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663).
71 S. REP. No. 97-532, at 33, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2539.
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crimes, Congress may have intended to limit restitution to those vic-
tims whose harm was relatively easy to prove.
In 1996, Congress amended the discretionary restitution statute
to define "victim. ' 72 According to the amended statute, a "victim" is
a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commis-
sion of an offense for which restitution may be ordered including,
in the case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, con-
spiracy, or pattern of criminal activity, any person directly harmed by
the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, con-
spiracy, or pattern. 73
Despite statutory language that seems to limit restitution to persons,
courts have considerably expanded this definition. Even in cases aris-
ing before the 1996 definition, several circuits held that nonpersons
fall within the scope of "victim. ' 74 Specifically, the field of restitution-
eligible victims now includes governmental entities7 5 and financial
institutions. 76
B. The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996
In 1996, Congress further demonstrated its commitment to victim
restitution 77 by passing the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act
72 Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1227
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
73 Id. § 205(a) (1) (F), 110 Star. at 1227, 1230 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663(a)(2)) (emphasis added).
74 See United States v. Durham, 755 F.2d 511, 513-14 (6th Cir. 1985) (concluding that
.a non-human entity may be a victim of the offense within the meaning of the Act" but
declining to define the "exact contours" of a victim under the VWPA); United States v.
Dudley, 739 F.2d 175, 176-78 (4th Cir. 1984) (awarding restitution to United States De-
partment of Agriculture for defendant's food stamp fraud); see also Lorraine Slavin & David
J. Sorin, Congress Opens a Pandora's Box-The Restitution Provisions of the Victim and Witness
Protection Act of 1982, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 507, 524 (1984) (arguing for interpreting the
term "victim" expansively despite suggestions in the legislative history that Congress only
contemplated that the term included persons).
75 See, e.g., United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 101 (2d Cir. 1991) (awarding resti-
tution to both the State of New York and the Internal Revenue Service as victims under the
VWPA); United States v. Hand, 863 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 (3d Cir. 1988) (allowing restitution
to the Drug Enforcement Agency and United States Attorney's Office); United States v.
Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d 1537, 1538-39, 1545-46 (10th Cir. 1987) (awarding restitution to the
Indian Health Services Division of the Department of Health and Human Services) (quot-
ing United States v. Ruffen, 780 F.2d 1493, 1496 (9th Cir. 1986)); United States v. Ferranti,
928 F. Supp. 206, 221, 224-25 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (awarding restitution to the New York City
Fire Department).
76 See, e.g., United States v. Kirkland, 853 F.2d 1243, 1246 (5th Cir. 1988) (upholding
a restitution award to the Farmer's Home Administration); Durham, 755 F.2d at 513 (find-
ing that both an insurance company and a bank qualify as victims under the VWPA).
77 See S. REP. No. 104-179, at 13-14 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924,
926-27 (outlining the Senate Judiciary Committee's three goals in drafting the mandatory
restitution provision: providing full restitution for all identifiable victims of covered of-
fenses; establishing a. single set of procedures for issuing restitution orders in federal crimi-
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(MVRA). 7 8  As its name implies, the MVRA makes restitution
mandatory in all federal convictions or plea agreements for offenses
constituting:
(i) a crime of violence ... ; (ii) an offense against property under
this title [tide 18], including any offense committed by fraud or de-
ceit; or (iii) an offense described in section 1365 (relating to tam-
pering with consumer products); and (B) in which an identifiable
victim or victims has suffered a physical injury or pecuniary loss. 79
The MVRA incorporated the same definition of victim set forth in the
discretionary restitution statute.8 0 In clarifying the parameters of the
definition, the Senate Judiciary Committee outlined a test for deter-
mining whether a person or entity qualifies as a victim. 81 The Com-
mittee emphasized that mandatory restitution would apply "only in
those instances where a named, identifiable victim suffers a physical
injury or pecuniary loss directly and proximately caused by the course
of conduct under the count or counts for which the offender is
convicted." 8 2
As under the 1982 Act, Congress declined to adopt a blanket pro-
vision making restitution mandatory in all federal crimes.8 3 Further,
the Senate Judiciary Committee made clear that Congress did not in-
tend to disrupt existing restitution regimes contained in other federal
statutes: "Regulatory or other statutes governing criminal conduct for
which restitution is not presently available historically contain their
own methods of providing restitution to victims and of establishing
systems of sanctions and reparations that the committee believes
should be left unaffected by this act."84
C. Judicial Interpretation of "Victim" Under the MVRA
Since the 1996 amendment to the MVRA, courts have continued
to interpret the definition of "victim" broadly. Indeed, courts consist-
ently have held that the U.S. government and its agencies can qualify
nal cases; and consolidating and strengthening procedures for collecting unpaid
restitution and unpaid fines).
78 See Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1227
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
79 See id. § 204, 110 Stat. at 1229 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)
(2000)).
80 Compare id. § 204, 110 Stat. at 1228 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663A(a) (2)), with 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a) (2) .
81 See S. REP. No. 104-179, at 19, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 932.
82 Id.
83 See id. at 18-19 (describing the list of felonies for which restitution is available and
then noting that the new statute preserves then-existing limits on the remedy's availability).
84 See id. at 19.
[Vol. 93:849
2008] RESTITUTION AND THE LACEY ACT
as victims under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a) (2) . -5 In 2004, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed this issue as
a matter of first impression.8 6 In United States v. Ekanem, the defen-
dant pled guilty to embezzling funds from the Department of Agricul-
ture's daycare program but challenged the district court's restitution
order.8 7 He argued that the Dictionary Act8 8 controlled the definition
of "person," which in turn controlled the meaning of "victim" in
§ 3663A(a) (2).89 Under his interpretation, the term "victim" would
not include governmental entities.90 The court, however, held that
the Dictionary Act did not control the meaning of "victim" under the
mandatory restitution statute because the context of § 3663A(a) (2)
"indicates otherwise."91 Specifically, the court looked to the enforce-
ment provision for both the mandatory and discretionary restitution
statutes.92 That provision states: "In any case in which the United
States is a victim, the court shall ensure that all other victims receive
full restitution before the United States receives any restitution. '93
Given this language, it would be impossible for the court to find that
"victim" as used in the two restitution statutes did not include the
United States.94 Lastly, the court noted that its holding conformed to
Congress's intent under the MVRA to broaden restitution as a
remedy.95
85 See, e.g., United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 793 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that a
government agency can be a victim under the MVRA for purposes of restitution); United
States v. Senty-Haugen, 449 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Internal Reve-
nue Service is an eligible victim under the MVRA).
86 See United States v. Ekanem, 383 F.3d 40, 41 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[W] e hold, as a mat-
ter of first impression in this Circuit, that the Government fits within the meaning of 'vic-
tim' under the MVRA.").
87 See id. at 41-42.
88 1 U.S.C. § 1 provides: "In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless
the context indicates otherwise ... the words 'person' and 'whoever' include corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals." 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
89 Ekanem, 383 F.3d at 42.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 42-43 (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1). The Ekanem Court also cites to Rowland v.
California Men's Colony, which explains that "context" as used in the Dictionary Act refers to
the text of the congressional statute at issue or related acts, but does not "point further
afield" to legislative history. 506 U.S. 194, 199-200 (1993).
92 See Ekanem, 383 F.3d at 42-44 (interpreting the meaning of "victim" in the MVRA
and VWPA).
93 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i) (2000).
94 Ekanem, 383 F.3d at 43. The court also noted that its prior cases and those of other
circuits holding that the United States was a "victim" within the scope of the VWPA com-
pelled the same finding under the MVRA, as the latter Act was a supplement to the former.
See id.; see also United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 101 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding a
restitution award of $1,221,900 in unpaid taxes to the Internal Revenue Service).
95 See Ekanem, 383 F.3d at 44 (citing S. REP. No. 104-179, at 12 (1995), as reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 925).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court has not yet granted certiorari to delimit the
scope of "victim" under the MVRA definition. 96 Although the Court
has ruled that the term "person" under other criminal statutes, such
as the Sherman Antitrust Act, does not include states,97 that interpre-
tation does not control when Congress specifically defines the term.
Circuits other than the Second Circuit have also dealt with the ques-
tion of whether the United States is a victim under the MVRA.98
Whether the Second Circuit's reasoning in Ekanem extends to foreign
states is the issue to which I now turn. Because other federal statutes
concerning foreign states provide helpful guidance here, I will ex-
amine three separate categories: antitrust statutes, federal RICO stat-
utes, and federal wire fraud statutes.
III
How FEDERAL LAw TREATS FOREIGN STATES AS VICTIMS IN
OTHER CONTEXTS
A. Antitrust Statutes
Foreign states have long had standing to sue in U.S. courts. 99 For
example, the Clayton Act is a criminal statute that includes a civil pro-
vision allowing plaintiffs to sue for treble damages by alleging that the
defendant violated antitrust law. 100 The Act itself has language per-
mitting a foreign state to sue in U.S. federal courts. 10 1 Although Con-
gress amended the Act in 1982 to give standing to foreign states, the
Supreme Court had already held that foreign states could sue under
the Clayton Act.10 2 In Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, the Court held
that foreign states qualified as "persons" within the Clayton Act's defi-
96 See, e.g., Balogun v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 425 F.3d 1356 (11 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547
U.S. 1113 (2006).
97 See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05 (1941).
98 See United States v. Senty-Haugen, 449 F.3d 862, 865-66 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing
Ekanem, 383 F.3d at 42-44) (dismissing defendant's argument that the United States is not
a "person" and therefore not a "victim" within the meaning of § 3663A(a) (2)); see also
Balogun, 425 F.3d at 1361 (citing Ekanem, 383 F.3d. at 43-44).
99 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000...
and is between . . . a foreign state .. .as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different
States."); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1964) ("[S]overeign
states are allowed to sue in the courts of the United States." (internal citations omitted));
Guar. Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 134 (1938) (permitting the Soviet govern-
ment to bring suit in federal court and relaxing the rules of procedure for foreign states).
100 See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
101 See id. § 15(b). However, foreign states are limited to "actual damages." See id.
§ 15(b)(1). The Act defines "foreign state" as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). Id. at
§ 15(c)(2). Under that provision, a "foreign state.. . includes a political subdivision of a
foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection
(b)." 28 U.S.C. §1603(a) (2000).
102 Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 318 (1978).
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nition of that word. 10 3 Pfizer is the only case in which the Court has
ruled on Congress's use of the term "person" as applied to a foreign
state. 10 4 As I argue that courts should read the MVRA and VWPA's
use of the word "person" to include foreign states, the Pfizer Court's
reasoning is instructive.
In Pfizer, India, Iran, and the Philippines sued under 15 U.S.C.
§ 15, alleging damages from Pfizer's price fixing and market manipu-
lation in its worldwide sales of antibiotics.1 05 The Court held that
whether or not a foreign state could sue depended on "whether it is a
'person' as that word is used in [15 U.S.C.] § 4."106 The Court ob-
served that it faced congressional silence on this question.10 7 Indeed,
as under the MVRA and VWPA definitions of "victim,"108 "there is no
statutory provision or legislative history that provides a clear an-
swer."109 The Court first looked to the dual purposes of the Clayton
Act's civil provision: deterring violators and compensating victims. 110
According to the Court, denying a foreign plaintiff the civil remedy
under § 4 would thwart Congress's dual aims." 1 Specifically, when a
domestic criminal conspiracy has ripple effects abroad, the threat of
suit by a foreign plaintiff furthers deterrence goals:
If foreign plaintiffs were not permitted to seek a remedy for their
antitrust injuries, persons doing business both in this country and
abroad might be tempted to enter into anticompetitive conspiracies
affecting American consumers in the expectation that the illegal
profits they could safely extort abroad would offset any liability to
plaintiffs at home. If, on the other hand, potential antitrust viola-
tors must take into account the full costs of their conduct, American
consumers are benefited by the maximum deterrent effect of treble
damages upon all potential violators.1 12
The same utilitarian reasoning allows a court to award restitution to
foreign victim states when defendants commit Title 18 offenses.1 13
The Court then rejected Pfizer's argument that Congress "clearly
understood" the word "person" to exclude foreign states when it
passed the Sherman Act in 1890.114 Nineteenth-century case law in-
103 See id. at 318-20.
104 Indeed, the scope of the word "person" was the central issue in Pfizer. See id. at 311.
105 See id. at 309. The district court dismissed one foreign state from the case, and five
other nations sued Pfizer in separate actions. See id. at 310 n.1.
106 Id. at 312.
107 See id.
108 See supra Part II.
109 Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 312.
110 See id. at 314.
111 See id. at 314-15.
112 Id. at 315.
113 See supra Part II.
114 See Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 315-16.
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terpreting contemporaneous statutes reveals that Congress applied
the term "person" to governmental bodies' 1 5 in much the same way
that courts gave "victim" a broad reading under the V-WPA. 116 Draw-
ing heavily on its own reasoning in Georgia v. Evans,117 the Court ac-
knowledged that a foreign state "can be victimized by anticompetitive
practices just as surely as a private person or a domestic State,"' 18 and
therefore "[n]othing in the [Sherman] Act, its history, or its policy,
could justify so restrictive a construction of the word 'person.""' 9
Given the Court's reasoning in Pfizer, no reasonable basis exists to
conclude that a foreign state can never qualify as a victim. Just as Pfizer
interpreted congressional silence as a license to expand the term "per-
son" to vindicate the legislative goals underlying the Clayton Act,
courts should take the same approach when interpreting the federal
restitution statutes. By passing the VWPA and MVRA, Congress in-
tended to broaden the age-old restitution remedy existing at common
law and ensure that courts apply it consistently. 120 Clear legislative
intent and the broader deterrence goals discussed in Pfizer justify
awarding restitution to foreign states, provided that a defendant's
crimes directly and proximately harmed the foreign state.
B. The Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act
Like the Clayton Act, the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organi-
zations Act (RICO) 121 is a unique federal criminal statute that allows
plaintiffs to bring civil suits in U.S. courts for damages resulting from
a defendant's predicate RICO offenses. 122 Such predicate offenses in-
clude bribery, 23 counterfeiting, 124 immigration-related frauds, 125 and
a laundry list of nearly two-dozen other crimes. 126 RICO's civil rem-
115 See id. at 315 n.15 (citing Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508, 514-17 (1893); Dollar
Say. Bank v. United States, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 227, 239 (1873); Cotton v. United States, 52
U.S. (11 How.) 229, 231 (1850)).
116 See supra notes 75-76.
117 316 U.S. 159, 162-63 (1942) (rejecting argument that "person," as used in antitrust
statutes, excludes all sovereign states).
I18 See Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 318.
119 Id. (quoting Evans, 316 U.S. at 162-63).
120 See supra notes 63-84.
121 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2000).
122 See id. § 1964(c). For background to the RICO statute and its civil remedy provi-
sion, see generally Michael A. Gardiner, Comment, The Enterprise Requirement: Getting to the
Heart of Civil RICO, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 663 (1988) (reviewing the history of RICO and dis-
cussing the lower courts' differing applications of Sedima S.P.RL. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479
(1985)); Faisal Shah, Note, Broadening the Scope of Civil RICO: Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
20 U.S.F. L. REv. 339 (1986) (discussing the history, purpose, and the Supreme Court's
interpretation of RICO in the context of a then-recent Supreme Court opinion).
123 18 U.S.C. § 201.
124 Id. §§ 471-73.
125 Id. §§ 1425-27.
126 See id. § 1961(1)(B).
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edy provision allows "[a] ny person injured in his business or property"
to recover treble damages for a defendant's violations of predicate
offenses. 127
Although Congress did not explicitly state that a foreign state has
standing to sue under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), it has implied that a for-
eign state may sue a domestic defendant under RICO.128 The Interna-
tional Money Laundering Abatement and Financial Anti-Terrorism
Act of 2001129 amended RICO to add additional predicate acts, such
as international money laundering. 30 As Senator John Kerry said to
Congress when it passed these RICO amendments, "[T]oday [we]
clarify that it is the intent of the legislature that our allies will have
access to our courts and the use of our laws if they are victims of smug-
gling, fraud, money laundering, or terrorism. ' 13 1 Because Congress
seems to acknowledge that foreign states can qualify as victims, it is
appropriate here to examine cases, few though they may be, in which
foreign states have claimed to qualify as victims under RICO. These
cases also illustrate how courts have interpreted the term "person" in a
statutory context other than the MVRA.
As a starting point, the RICO statute defines "person" as "any in-
dividual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in
property."1 32 Lower courts have held that a foreign state can qualify
as a person under RICO's definition. 133 In Republic of the Philippines v.
Marcos, the Ninth Circuit dismissed defendant Ferdinand Marcos's ar-
gument that the Republic was not a "person" under § 1961(3).134 As
the court said, "[t] he foreign nature of the Republic does not deprive
it of statutory personhood. 1 35
In European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., the district court ana-
lyzed the scope of "person" under § 1961(3) in more detail. 136 There,
127 See id. § 1964(c).
128 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, Title III, 115 Stat. 272, 296-342 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 18, 22, 31
U.S.C.) (incorporating the International Money Laundering Abatement and Financial
Anti-Terrorism Act into the Patriot Act).
129 Id.
130 See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c) (7).
131 147 CONG. REc. S11028 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
132 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3).
133 See Republic of the Phil. v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1988); European
Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d. 456, 487 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). But see United States
v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family, 879 F.2d 20, 23 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the
United States cannot be a "person" for purposes of civil RICO suits without "unequivocal
expression" of congressional intent).
134 See Marcos, 862 F.2d at 1358 (citing Ill. Dep't of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312
(7th Cir. 1985)).
135 Id. (citing Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978)).
136 See 150 F. Supp. 2d at 487-88.
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several member states of the European Community (EC) sued Ameri-
can tobacco companies under the RICO civil provision, claiming that
the defendants engaged in a broad conspiracy to smuggle cigarettes
into the EC to avoid paying import duties and other taxes.137 The
court determined that the EC qualified as a "person" under RICO by
looking at dictionary definitions, observing in particular that the term
"entity" includes "public entity."138 The court also stressed that Con-
gress chose not to qualify "person" with the adjective "private" when
drafting § 1961(3) "despite the use of the phrase 'private persons' in
the legislative history."13 9 Indeed, as the court observed, finding that
a foreign state can bring a civil RICO action "accords fully with Con-
gress' intention that RICO 'not merely compensate victims but turn
them into prosecutors ... dedicated to eliminating racketeering activ-
ity.' "140 Mindful that criminal activities in the United States may have
repercussions abroad, the court in RJR Nabisco observed that limiting
RICO to domestic plaintiffs "would. .. discount the impact on other
countries of racketeering activities originating in the United
States.1
141
The Second and Eleventh Circuits both held that the common-
law revenue rule prevents a foreign state from suing under RICO to
recover tax revenue lost through fraud. 142 Neither circuit, however,
disputed the conclusion that a foreign state could qualify as a person
under the RICO statute, thus allowing the foreign victim state to
sue. 143
In Marcos-the only reported case in which a foreign state suc-
cessfully sued under RICO-the Republic of the Philippines obtained
a preliminary injunction against its former dictator and his wife.1 44
The Republic alleged that Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos engaged in a
RICO enterprise when they transported into the United States vast
sums of money they obtained fraudulently from the Republic.1 45 By
investing in California real estate, establishing California bank ac-
counts, and bringing property worth over $7 million into Hawaii, the
Marcoses committed wire and mail fraud, and transported stolen
137 See id. at 460-61.
138 See id. at 487 & n.17.
139 See id. at 487-88.
140 Id. at 489 (alteration in original) (quoting Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557
(2000)).
141 Id.
142 See European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2005); Republic
of Hond. v. Philip Morris Cos., 341 F.3d 1253, 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2003); Att'y Gen. of
Can. v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 2001).
143 See RJR Nabisco, 424 F.3d at 177-83; Republic of Hond., 341 F.3d at 1255-61.
144 See Republic of the Phil. v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1358, 1364 (9th Cir. 1988).
145 See id. at 1358.
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property.146 As the Ninth Circuit explained, this pattern satisfied all
elements of a RICO offense:
The purposes of the acts here alleged are the same-to invest and
to conceal fraudulently-obtained booty. The results are the same-
the investment of the booty. The principals are the same-the Mar-
coses. The victim is the same-the Republic. The episodes are not
isolated events. They represent a plan and a practice of getting the
fruits of fraud out of the Philippines and into the assumed safety of
the United States. 14 7
Thus, even though federal law viewed the primary victim in Marcos as
the United States because the Marcoses based their operations in the
United States, thereby harming U.S. interstate commerce, 148 the
RICO statute still gave judicial recourse to a secondary victim-a for-
eign state. 149
As these examples show, the RICO statute provides foreign states
with a means to qualify as victims in U.S. courts. Significantly, these
cases also show that courts are free to read the term "person" expan-
sively. Judges, therefore, need not adopt a strict textualist approach
when interpreting the term as used in the MVRA and VWPA.
C. The Federal Wire Fraud Statute
The federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, creates addi-
tional scenarios in which a foreign state can qualify as a victim. It is
therefore instructive to examine how courts have considered restitu-
tion in the context of that statute. Indeed, Congress "has expressed
with notable clarity a policy of mandatory restitution in all wire fraud
prosecutions."1 5 0
In Pasquantino v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a plot
to defraud a foreign government of its tax revenues violated § 1343.151
The defendants, while in New York, ordered liquor from stores in Ma-
ryland by telephone. 15 2 They then smuggled the liquor into Canada,
evading Canadian customs officials and avoiding import duties
equivalent to twice the purchase price. 153 The Court concluded that
the revenue constituted property that Canada had a right to recover
because Canada had a clear economic interest in receiving its tax reve-
146 See id.
147 Id. Even the dissent in Marcos did not challenge the validity of the Republic's
claim. See id. at 1364 (Schroeder, J., dissenting) ("I join in the majority's conclusion that
there is a well-pleaded RICO claim providing federal subject matter jurisdiction.").
148 See id. at 1358-59.
149 See id. at 1359, 1363.
150 Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 383 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
151 See id. at 352-53 (majority opinion).
152 See id. at 353.
153 See id.
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nue. 15 4 According to the Court, the common-law revenue rule, which
prohibits one country from enforcing another's tax laws, did not bar
conviction1 5 5 so long as the United States brought its case pursuant to
a domestic regulatory interest and not purely to enforce foreign
laws.156 Although the district court did not order restitution after the
U.S. government recommended against it, 15 7 the government re-
versed itself and argued in favor of restitution before the Supreme
Court.15
8
After finding that the underlying prosecution in Pasquantino
served valid domestic interests, the Court implied that a district court
could award restitution to Canada if it chose to do so.' 59 According to
the Court:
We do not think it matters whether the provision of restitution is
mandatory in this prosecution. Regardless, the wire fraud statute
advances the Federal Government's independent interest in punish-
ing fraudulent domestic criminal conduct .... The purpose of award-
ing restitution in this action [pursuant to 18 U.S. C. § 3663A] is not to
collect a foreign tax, but to mete out appropriate criminal punishment for
that conduct. 1 60
The Court also stated in dicta:
[A] ny conflict between mandatory restitution and the revenue rule
would not change our holding today. If awarding restitution to for-
eign sovereigns were contrary to the revenue rule, the proper reso-
lution would be to construe the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act
not to allow such awards, rather than to assume that the later en-
acted restitution statute impliedly repealed § 1343 as applied to
frauds against foreign sovereigns. 1 6 1
Significantly, the Court did not decide that the MVRA prohibited such
awards,' 6 2 implicitly suggesting that under the MVRA's own com-
mand, an award shall follow.
154 See id. at 355-57.
155 See id. at 364-68.
156 See id. at 364.
157 See id. at 382 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Brief for the United States at 19, Pasquan-
tino, 544 U.S. 349 (No. 03-725), 2004 WL 1743937.
158 See Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 382 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("While 'the prosecutor
did concede below that restitution was not appropriately ordered,' it is in fact '[t]he posi-
tion of the United States ... that restitution under the mandatory statute should be or-
dered . . . .'" (alterations in original) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 36,
Pasquantino, 544 U.S. 349 (No. 03-725)).
159 See id. at 364-68 (majority opinion).
160 Id. at 365 (emphasis added).
161 Id.
162 See id.
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GRANT RESTITUTION TO FOREIGN STATES TO PROMOTE
COOPERATION WITH U.S. PROSECUTIONS WHERE
DEFENDANT'S ACTIVITIES HARMED A
FOREIGN STATE
Creating an incentive for foreign cooperation is both consistent
with the original purposes of the Lacey Act and critical to its success.
By criminalizing the importation and sale of illegally harvested wild-
life, the Lacey Act seeks to eliminate the United States as a "market of
the 'pothunter." 163 Simultaneously, the Act is intended to augment
state and foreign environmental laws and regulations, thereby giving
teeth to the federal policy against poaching. 164 As Senator John
Chafee made clear, by shutting down the U.S. market to poachers, the
Lacey Act is a vital component of international conservation efforts:
These [foreign] countries are what one could call "wildlife-pro-
ducing" nations. Their attempts to protect various species can be all
but torpedoed by the fact that a wildlife consumer always waits
somewhere. While some consumption is justified, other trade vio-
lates the efforts both domestically and internationally to preserve
species.
This is what the Lacey Act is about....
What the Lacey Act says is that we are willing to close an open
door here in this country, so that international conservation goals
can be met. 165
To meet these goals, nations will have to assist each other in enforcing
relevant conservation laws. As the Senate made clear, such coopera-
tion is key to the success of the Lacey Act:
[The Act] is also designed to promote reciprocity. If we assist a for-
eign country in enforcing its conservation laws by closing our mar-
ket to wildlife taken illegally in that country, they may in turn help
to enforce conservation laws of the United States by prohibiting the
sale within their borders of wildlife taken illegally within the United
States.166
Bengis underscores the need for a cooperative approach to con-
servation-both importing and exporting countries must ensure that
antipoaching efforts are successful. As the U.S. government indi-
163 H.R. REP. No. 97-276, at 7 (1981).
164 See H.R. REP. No. 56-474, at 2 (1900) ("This bill is intended to begin where the
State laws leave off.").
165 Amending the Black Bass and Lacey Acts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Resource Protec-
tion of the Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong. 1 (1979) (statement of Sena-
tor John H. Chafee).
166 S. REP. No. 91-526 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1413, 1425.
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cated, the United States and South Africa both had substantial inter-
ests at stake in the prosecution of Arnold Bengis:
[T]he United States is the world's largest consumer of South Coast
rock lobster, purchasing over 80% of [such] lobster harvested off
the South African coast. The defendants' activities-in massively
overharvesting that resource and dumping large quantities of stolen
lobster on the United States market-had a serious impact on the
United States market, the long-term health of the rock lobster pop-
ulation, and the United States' long-term rock lobster supply.
... It likely is no exaggeration to conclude that the defendants'
crimes made them rich at the expense of considerable damage to
South Africa's natural resources.
167
Although South Africa has an established legal system and effec-
tive law enforcement agencies to combat poaching, 168 many other
"wildlife-producing" states do not. For this reason, the cooperative ap-
proach to international conservation may fail unless such foreign
states have added incentives to assist the United States in Lacey Act
prosecutions.
It is here that restitution will likely play a critical role. By allowing
foreign states to collect restitution from defendants convicted of
Lacey Act offenses, federal judges may be able to promote greater co-
operation with U.S. agencies. If foreign states know at the outset that
they stand to collect restitution from defendants convicted in U.S.
courts, the foreign states have an incentive to help ensure successful
prosecutions under the Lacey Act. These foreign states should be
more inclined to lift any barriers to cooperation with the United
States, be they diplomatic, bureaucratic, or otherwise.
In addition, because a U.S. judge must ultimately decide whether
to grant restitution, 169 there is little danger of abuse by foreign states
erroneously claiming that they qualify as victims. Under both the
MVRA and VWPA definitions of "victim," the United States must show
that, at a minimum, the foreign state was "directly and proximately
harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for which restitu-
tion may be ordered."'170 This statutory test protects against the risk of
a foreign state obtaining restitution after making only a colorable
claim of victim status.' v1
167 See Opposition to Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 18, at 31-32, 36.
168 See Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998, available at http://www.info.gov.za/
gazette/acts/1998/al 8-98.pdf.
169 See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (2000); id. § 3663A(a)(1).
170 Id. § 3663(a) (2); id. § 3663A(a) (2).
171 See id. § 3663(a) (2); id. § 3663A(a) (2).
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CONCLUSION
Combating wildlife poaching and enforcing U.S. conservation
laws requires an international cooperative effort. Although federal
laws like the Lacey Act allow for prosecutions of offenders who import
illegally caught fish and wildlife into the United States, sometimes for-
eign states may need an added incentive to cooperate in prosecuting
such cases.
I have argued that federal courts can provide this incentive by
awarding restitution to foreign states that prove they were directly and
proximately harmed by defendants' smuggling activities. Although
the federal restitution statutes do not explicitly allow courts to make
such awards, granting restitution in this manner would be consistent
with purposive theories of statutory interpretation. In addition, fed-
eral law already allows foreign states to qualify as victims in other con-
texts. Expanding restitution is consistent with these aims.
Furthermore, federal courts should utilize their traditional pow-
ers at equity and grant restitution to foreign states where appropriate.
If resistant foreign states know that they stand to collect restitution if a
defendant is convicted under the Lacey Act, such states will be more
likely to assist the United States. That assistance, in turn, could in-
crease the likelihood of a conviction and further international conser-
vation efforts.
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